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SYMPOSIUM ON IMMIGRATION APPEALS AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW
IMMIGRATION LAW 2006
John T. Noonan, Jr.'
Ambivalence is the attitude that prevails among Americans when they
think of immigration law today. Why? First, we can't decide whether we
want the immigrants in or out. We cannot run our restaurants, our
hotels, our taxis or even our farms and factories without them. On the
other hand, we do not want them to take jobs that Americans need.
Second, many of us are conscious that we are a nation of immigrants;
that, at some point or other in our family history, our parents or earlier
ancestors came from abroad. We don't like to close the door on people
like those who preceded us or procreated us. On the other hand, we
have values and democratic customs that immigrants may not understand
or adopt. We resent the intrusion into our accepted ways. Third, we
know that the immigrants are human beings, not likely to be very
different from ourselves. We know that the humanity of each person has
a claim upon us. On the other hand, we believe that citizenship makes a
difference. Citizens have rights that Congress and the courts have not
accorded other human beings. The ambivalence is neatly captured in the
federal statute regarding counsel for immigrants. The caption reads
"Right to counsel."' The text speaks of the privilege of having counsel .
Does the immigrant have the right to a lawyer or simply the privilege of
paying for one?
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We cannot resolve our underlying ambivalence in an afternoon. I
suggest that we recognize its influence on our law and its administration.
Immigration law is designed to keep the immigrant out and to let the
immigrant in. How that is done depends a good deal on the lawyers in
the legal system. I focus on them as key to the working of immigration
law. We have heard about the Real ID Act. My focus is on Real
Lawyers.
Each month the Ninth Circuit receives an average of over 500 petitions
for review from decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals.3 Many
of these are asylum cases in which the petitioner contends that he has
met the legal definition of a refugee, a person who is "unable or
unwilling to return . . . because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion., 4 These cases are the ones
that should provide the greatest pause to any judge as well as to any
lawyer who is working on immigration cases. Asylum cases ask the
judges and lawyers involved to determine whether the individual asking
for asylum will be sent back to a country in which he or she may meet
persecution, torture, or death.
Each case centers on a person. Usually each case affects the person's
spouse and often that person's children. You cannot comprehend the
problems presented by immigration law today by thinking only in terms
of statistics or of managing caseloads or moving cases along.
Quantification will miss the persons in the process. A real lawyer will
not miss them.
Yet before going directly to my theme of the lawyer's role, let me
recite a few statistics from the Department of Justice. We do need these
statistics to put the lawyers' problems in perspective. In round numbers,
7 million persons, it is guessed, now live in the United States without
documentation.
Each year,
350,000 persons enter without documentation,
163,000 are excluded or deported,
11,000 are granted asylum by immigration officers,
11,000 are granted asylum by immigration judges or the Board,
12,000 seek relief in courts of appeals,
3. See John R.B. Palmer, Stephen W. Yale-Loehr & Elizabeth Cronin, Why Are So
Many People Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An
Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 48
fig.2 (2005).
4. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000).
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153,000 are not accounted for and join the 7 million already
here.'
Even if the government's position prevailed in all 12,000 cases on
appeal, the total would be trivial in comparison to the millions already
here without documentation; the total would be less than 10% of the
153,000 persons who annually enter the country without documentation
and never enter the legal system.
In the face of these figures, does it make a great deal of sense for
lawyers to litigate each appeal to the bitter end? I do not know the cost
of each appeal. I cannot refrain from asking if the equivalent amount
spent on patrolling the border would not exclude a larger number of
persons without right to be here. I cannot refrain from observing that
the Internal Revenue Service, enforcing a precise and complicated
statute, often compromises cases. Should it be harder, with a statute
scarcely less precise and complicated, to compromise when not dollars
but people's lives are at issue?
Inadequate treatment of the asylum cases by lawyers is not new. In my
experience it goes back to 1986 soon after I first joined the court. It has
not varied whether the administration is Republican or Democratic. To
catch the flavor of what has come to courts of appeals in immigration
cases, allow me to read from the transcript of the hearing accorded Ms.
Jesus Escobar-Grijalva 6 when she applied for asylum:
JUDGE TO MS. ESCOBAR
Q. Who is your present attorney, because no one is with
you.
A. It's a new American one.
Q. A new American one? What is the name of this
attorney?
A. I don't know.
Q. Have you even met this new attorney, yet, ma'am? This
new American attorney as you described him to be?
A. Yes, I saw him.
5. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REVIEW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY 2005
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK K2 (2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/
fy05syb.pdf; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S.
COURTS 2005, at 114 tbl.B-3 (2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2005/
contents.html; OFFICE OF IMMIGR. STATISTICS, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2004, at 6 (2005), available at
http://www.uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/publications/AnnuaiReportEnforcement
2004.pdf.
6. Escobar-Grijalva v. INS, 206 F.3d 1331 (9th Cir. 2001).
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Q. What is the name of this attorney? It looks like Jeremy
Frost is his name. Is that his name?
A. (Indiscernible).
Q. A man, according to the writing in here, at least. He is
still part of the same law office of McGuire and company. But,
my question to you, ma'am, is where is [sic] any of your
attorneys? Where are they?
A. I don't know, it-can you allow me to go out and see.
Q. Well, ma'am, have you seen them today at all? Any of
your attorneys?
A. Yes, I did see him.
Q. You saw Mr. Frost?
A. Yes.
Q. Or was this gentleman his assistant that you saw, ma'am?
Don't get the two confused.
A. No, it (indiscernible).
Q. Okay, and he said he would be representing you? When
did you last see him? When did you last see him ma'am?
A. I just saw him before I got in here. Would you please
allow me to go out one moment.
Q. We'll have the court interpreter go out there and call his
name.
[A break occurs; the session then resumes.]
JUDGE TO MR. FROST
Q. Counsel, I understand you're Jeremy Frost, is that right?
A. That's correct, Your Honor.
JUDGE TO MS. ESCOBAR
Q. Now, ma'am, is this your attorney, Mr. Frost?
A. No.
Q. No?
A. It's another one.
JUDGE TO MR. FROST
Q. Okay, well, counsel, have you ever met your client?
A. No, I haven't, Your Honor. But I'm-I'm from-
[MS. ESCOBAR TO JUDGE]
A. He hasn't seen me.
JUDGE TO THE INTERPRETER
Q. Wait, wait. Let-let her finish. What-what's that?
A. He-it's another gentleman.
[Vol. 55:905
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Q. Okay, well, Mr. Frost is from the law offices of Terance
McGuire. He is one-apparently one of the new attorneys.
A. Actually-
Q. This is not the person you-you met outside? The new
attorney you said-the new American attorney?
A. With a black jacket.
JUDGE TO MR. FROST
Q. Counsel, do you have any idea who that is?
A. No, I don't, Your Honor.
Q. Is that one of your assistants maybe? One of your clerks
or something?
A. I'm-I'm not even with McGuire's office. I'm with Jim
Valinoti.
Q. You're with Valinoti? Well-
A. Yeah.
Q. (indiscernible) really confusing me, because your-your
notice comes in-in McGuire's office's name, not Valinoti's.
And is there some reason why you submitted a notice with
another law firm? I mean, I'm really confused now. If you're
with Mr. Valinoti's office, why are you submitting a notice
under Mr. Terance McGuire's offices?
A. Your Honor, I'm a little confused too. And if I could call
a recess for five minutes to just get it clarified. I-I really don't
have the answer.
Q. Have you met you [sic] client before today, counsel[?] I
mean, right now, because she said she never saw you before
until you walked in right now.
A. That's true, Your Honor. I've never met her.
Q. And you're going to be presenting her case?
A. Actually, I was hoping to have time, you know, before,
but I just ran from this hearing to this hearing.
MR. YOUTSLER [COUNSEL FOR THE GOVERNMENT]
TO JUDGE
Q. I don't think he can represent her. He hasn't ever met
her before. He has no idea what her case [is] about.7
Such was the record in this case where at issue was Jesus Escobar's
asylum in the United States-a series of false starts, of non sequiturs, of
unanswered questions, of misunderstood answers, culminating, despite
government counsel's intelligent intervention, in the immigrant being
saddled by the judge with a lawyer who had never seen her before. It's
7. Id. at 1332-33.
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hard to pin all the fault here on any single person. Was it the interpreter
who didn't get everything said? Was it the stenographer, who probably
wasn't there but sometime later listened to the taped recording of the
proceeding and did her best to render it intelligible? Was it the
immigration judge, who so often seems to follow his own train of thought
without paying much attention to government counsel, to Jeremy Frost,
or to Ms. Escobar herself?
However the blame is to be assigned for a jumble that comes close to a
skit on Saturday Night Live, imagine coming to a court of law with this
transcript! A panel of the Board made its decision based on this record.
Lawyers in the Justice Department then chose to defend the Board's
decision in the court of appeals. The government did not concede error
and ask for a remand. Speaking now from my point of view, it was
mulish persistence in defending a decision based on this record that
constituted the capital mistake made in this asylum case.
Any lawyer who has had any experience, any lawyer who has thought
about her work at all, knows that lawyers are not fungible. To determine
that a given person has gone to law school, has passed the bar exam, and
is admitted to the bar is only the first step in determining whether the
lawyer functioned as counsel in the case under consideration.
Like many phrases used in law, the phrase "represented by counsel"
has a breadth of meaning and evokes a history beyond the three words
employed. Here what is evoked is what it means to have as an advocate
one professionally skilled in the subject. Does it mean being represented
by someone you have just met, who is familiar with the pattern of
questions in immigration cases but knows nothing of the particular
strengths and weaknesses of your case? Such a person, who has gone to
law school and been admitted to the bar and knows how to ask routine
questions, is certainly a lawyer. No one familiar with the history and
standards of the legal profession would think of him as an advocate. No
one immersed in the ethos of our profession would credit such a
scarecrow with being counsel representing a client.
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in his account of life in the Soviet Union has a
passage on the precious value of counsel, of having, at a moment of great
trial in one's life, "a clear-minded ally who knows the law.",8 Was Jeremy
Frost such a clear-minded ally for Jesus Escobar-Grijalva because Frost
knew the law and could articulate questions in terms of it? By no means,
for nothing suggests that Frost was her ally. He had wandered, for some
unexplained purpose, into the hearing. He was not connected with the
McGuire firm that the immigration judge believed he belonged to. He




was, as it were, press-ganged into appearing for this woman he had never
met. Is it necessary to say that even in a totalitarian dictatorship Jeremy
Frost would not have appeared as the ally of the person facing expulsion
from the country?
It seems to me reading at leisure the transcript I have read to you
today that the IJ might have recognized that, when he accepted Frost as
Escobar's counsel, he was taking a simulacrum for the real thing. It
seems to me that Frost himself, familiar as he seems to have been with
routine in immigration cases, could have successfully objected that he
was not qualified to represent a woman he had just met. The
government's lawyer, Alan Youtsler, raised the question pointedly. He
acted as government counsel should act, seeking due process for his
adversary. But both the IJ and Frost were under pressure to act
instantly. I assume that the attorneys who defended the IJ's decision
before the Board and those who defended the Board's decision before us
had a little more time before they acted. How could they have supposed
that Jesus Escobar had been represented by counsel?
The lawyers for the Justice Department had time to consider this
question. I am not sure that they thought they could consider it. Their
client was the Justice Department and its employees, the members of the
Board and the IJ. The attorneys had not chosen the case, they were
assigned it by a supervisor. Their job, they assumed, was to defend what
had been decided.
I am not privy to the internal workings of the Justice Department. I
reach the conclusion as to what the lawyers assigned to the case probably
thought from the way that lawyers from the Justice Department have
responded in open court when I have asked them about the soundness of
the position they have been defending. I can recall only one or two
instances in which such a lawyer has replied, "Now that you put it that
way, we're wrong. We'd like to go to mediation and see if we could work
out a solution."
When your client has made a major mistake, it's a major mistake not to
concede it. In the case of lawyers for the government it's a major
mistake for the government not to grant them the power to admit error.
They should not be treated as automatons, compelled to defend the
Department, right or wrong.
Immigration judges, informally held to decide a quota of cases, have to
get through crowded calendars. They are understandably disturbed by
immigration lawyers shuffling cases. Their problems could be dealt with
by appointing more immigration judges. A fair start has been made in
2006]
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that direction with the number increasing from 75 in 1987 to 225 this
9
year.
The immigration judges' problems could also be lessened by purging
the immigration bar of lawyers who merely batten on hapless
immigrants. The Ninth Circuit, for example, keeps a watch list of lawyers
identified by the panels of the court on account of their unprofessional
conduct of an immigrant's case. Identification of three professional
failures or one gross failure leads to a procedure by the court resulting in
the imposition of sanctions. Over 100 lawyers have been disciplined in
this way.
A fortiori, the problem could be diminished by reducing the number of
nonlaywers who gum up the legal system. In Mexico and other Latin
countries a notario is a member of a learned and honorable profession.
A person holding himself out as a notario in the United States and
offering legal advice to a noncitizen is engaged in the unlawful practice of
law. These nonlawyers doing lawyers' work prey on helpless folk. The
state bar and the Department of Justice should seek their elimination by
prosecution or injunction. But neither problem-neither that of the
impatient judge nor that of incompetent or unqualified counsel-would
loom as large as it presently does if the lawyers of the Justice
Department took to heart what it means to be a lawyer.
Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales has stated with eloquent
succinctness that the immigration judges "are the face of American
justice" to the persons before their courts.' ° Analogously, the lawyers in
the system are the face of American law to these arrivals from elsewhere.
It is critical that the lawyers on each side of an immigration case
understand their responsibilities.
It is a major mistake for any client to insist that his counsel defend a
major mistake in court. For the government, the mistake is magnified.
The government, of course, has governmental interests to protect,
including the interest of enforcing the immigration law. The government
also has the interest of assuring compliance with the law in the process of
enforcing immigration law. Spotty and uneven that enforcement is, with
millions of undocumented aliens at home here; but where legal process is
used, the law should be faithfully observed. To enforce immigration law
by violating the law set up to govern the process is to subvert
immigration law. Lawyers for the Department of Justice, part of the face
of the law, must have the authority not to defend the mistaken decision
9. Executive Office for Immigration Review, United States Department of Justice,
EOIR Immigration Court Listing, http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/sibpages/ICadr.htm (last
visited Sept. 20, 2006).
10. Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Att'y Gen., to Immigration Judges
(Jan. 9, 2006) (on file with Catholic University Law Review).
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of an IJ or the Board and to admit error if such a case has gone on to a
court of appeals.
Different from the authority to acknowledge mistake is the exercise of
discretion as to what decisions to appeal or defend. Eighteen years ago,
one of my senior colleagues remarked to me, "The INS is the only
agency in Washington that doesn't exercise discretion." I have found the
comment in general to hold true. It doesn't make a difference what the
political character of the administration is. The INS (now the DHS) has
its own character. Once it hops upon one immigrant out of the millions it
leaves undisturbed, the agency is determined not to let him go. It seems
often enough, at least in the cases that reach a court of appeals, that the
agency is bound not to compromise, not to consider equities, and to
vindicate, at whatever cost to other values, the letter of the law.
Something of the spirit of Inspector Javert seems to infect the agency.
Playing the part of Jean Valjean's nemesis in Les Miserables, it seems to
see itself as enforcing the inexorable march of heavenly constellations.
Can a prosecutor not prosecute Jean Valjean for theft when he steals a
loaf of bread? Of course an American prosecutor will take into account
all the circumstances and the penalty. Can the DHS not deport Valjean
if he got here on a phony visitor's visa to care for his sick mother,
married an American woman, and has a two-year-old citizen son? Once
he's been cited to appear before an immigration court Valjean is in the
vise of remorseless, discretionless prosecutors.
Real lawyers not only can tell their clients that the clients are wrong.
They can tell their clients that they are asses to insist on their rights, that
the cost of what is their due is not worth getting their due, and that, while
perfectly authorized by statute, the course of conduct wanted by the
client will do harm to his own reputation or to his relationship with his
family or to the welfare of his community. Not every legal right requires
a lawyer to press for a legal remedy. Discretion is not only the better
part of valor. Discretion is at the heart of the lawyer's counseling skills.
Freed to exercise discretion, the lawyers of the Department of Justice
could transform the litigation and mediation of immigration cases.
The truth is that the INS does not deport all those whom it seeks to
deport. As the Inspector General of the Department of Justice found in
two examinations, one made in 1996, the other in 2003, the INS removed
90% of detained aliens and 13% or less of nondetained aliens and only
3% of nondetained asylum seekers, for all of whom a final order of
deportation had been issued and all appeals exhausted." The Inspector
General does not say how many of these cases ended in voluntary
11. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT No. 1-2003-
004, THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE'S REMOVAL OF ALIENS
ISSUED FINAL ORDERS 11-12 (2003).
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departure rather than deportation, nor does he say how many
deportation orders had been affirmed by the Board of Immigration
Appeals or by a court of appeals. In the report for 2003, 55% of the total
involved the detained, 45%, the nondetained12 Today in the Ninth
Circuit, the percentage of cases involving detained versus nondetained
aliens is much more dramatic. At this window in time, we have over 3665
cases pending before the court. Just 52 of these cases, about 1.4%,
involve a detained alien.'3 So, if past practice is a guide, 516 deportations
may actually occur after our decisions are issued.
Even if we assume the conservative 55/45 breakdown of the Inspector
General and apply it to all of the courts of appeals today, it would mean
that of the 12,000 cases, 5400 involve the nondetained. Then if the
government won all the cases, 4698 would not result in deportation. If
the cases all involved asylum, only 162 deportations would result.
Voluntary departures might swell this number slightly. Exactness here is
impossible. The overall picture is clear. The government litigates a large
part of the time without a practical prospect of actually deporting the
alien.
The Inspector General also reports that in a small number of these
cases there is no deportation because, for "political or humanitarian
reasons," the government decides not to deport. Here, at last, the kind
of discretion a humane government should be exercising is exercised.
Consider the cost of not exercising it sooner. First, and most obviously,
the federal courts have been burdened with thousands of cases that led
nowhere, as has the Board of Immigration Appeals. Second, the lawyers
who should have shaped the system by discretionary decisions not to
prosecute have been shut out. Thirdly, the power to exercise humanity
has been effectively delegated to immigration officers beyond judicial
scrutiny and lawyers' insights. "They want us to come to them on our
knees," an experienced litigator observed to me. That posture may suit
an imperial official. It is not congruent with American democracy.
In the prosecution of major malefactors, who are sometimes defended
by highly competent counsel, the Department of Justice does an
excellent job. American justice is exemplary. Why should the
Department's treatment of those seeking shelter here fall below this
standard?
In fact, on November 17, 2000, Doris Meissner, Commissioner of the
INS, issued a memorandum entitled "Exercising Prosecutorial
Discretion" and directed to regional directors, district directors, chief
12. Id. at 5.
13. Cathy A. Catterson, Clerk of the Court, United States Court of Appeals, Ninth
Circuit, San Francisco, CA.
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patrol agents, and regional and district counsel. 14  The memorandum
declared in italics:
Service officers are not only authorized by law but expected to
exercise discretion in a judicious manner at all stages of the
enforcement process-from planning investigations to enforcing
final orders-subject to their chains of command and to the
particular responsibilities and authority applicable to their
specific position. In exercising this discretion, officers must take
into account the principles described below in order to promote
the efficient and effective enforcement of the immigration laws
and the interests of justice.15
Thirteen pages of detail followed this excellent statement. Among
factors that could trigger the exercise of discretion the following facts
("whether proven or alleged") were listed:
Lawful permanent residents;
Aliens with a serious health condition;
Juveniles;
Elderly aliens;
Adopted children to U.S. citizens;
U.S. military veterans;
Aliens with lengthy presence in United States (i.e., 10 years or
more); or
Aliens present in the United States since childhood.
6
Although this memorandum was issued after the presidential election
of 2000 by a lame duck administration, counsel for the government have
represented to our court that it is still in effect. It seems scarcely too
much to say that it presents a reform of major significance. Like most
reforms, vigilance is necessary to prevent the return of old ways. The
existence of this directive establishes that there is no conflict between the
policy of the agency and what the judges who must deal with its work
desire.
Lawyers-real lawyers, lawyers exercising discretion, candid with their
departmental client-are the key. The Department has such lawyers.
The Department can recruit more of them for this important work. The
solution is not to assign a tax lawyer or an EPA lawyer to argue an
immigration case. The U.S. Attorney's office for the Southern District of
New York may be an exception. But, generally speaking, the solution is
not to ask an assistant U.S. attorney in Alaska to write a brief for the
14. Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm'r, Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., to
Regional Dirs., et al. (Nov. 17, 2000) (on file with Catholic University Law Review).
15. Id. at 1.
16. Id. at 11.
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Eleventh Circuit in Atlanta. Lawyers are dexterous in turning their hand
to new fields of law. But important specialities require discretion greater
than dexterity. Immigration law is too important work to farm out
around the country to assistant U.S. attorneys not sensitive to the
requirements of discretion in the context of asylum cases whose center is
the life of a person.
To conclude: Attorney General Gonzales is right to want the
immigration judges to show true justice in the conduct of their cases and
in their decisions. Conscientious, fair-minded as many of these judges
are, they are capable of fulfilling this requirement. Purging the sleaze
from the immigration bar will hasten achievement of this objective. So
will resources devoted to good interpreters and live court reporters. So
will increasing the number of good immigration judges and giving each
one of them a law clerk (the ratio now in San Francisco is lopsided, 6
judges to 1 clerk). So will intelligently enlarging the Board. Above all,
immigration law in this new century will benefit by being put in the hands
of a Department of Justice that empowers its immigration counsel with
the responsibility that each lawyer should possess to interpret the law
fairly, equitably, and humanely, candidly telling his or her governmental
client when the client has made a mistake or is being unduly obstinate,
inequitable or inhumane. The Department of Justice should have a
human face because, after all, we are humans dealing with each other.
[Vol. 55:905
